I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to Guantánamo, 1 those detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility filed hundreds of petitions. No action, however, was taken on the petitions until the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees are "entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention." 2 As of this writing, the D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five petitions, granting twenty-nine, under both the Bush and Obama Administrations.
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tained in relation to that conflict. Thus, much of the discussion on internment in this article concerns the extent to which analogous application of IHL internment standards applicable to international armed conflict is appropriate in non-international armed conflict and, if so, in which form. 8 The first section of this article provides background by briefly describing the bases for internment under conventional IHL and explaining how IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to non-international armed conflicts in order to address internment. The following section discusses the executive branch's practice of internment at Guantánamo, assessing both the asserted legal bases for internment and the various internment standards in relation to IHL. The third section reviews the D.C. District Court's interpretation of the executive's internment standards to see if the court's decisions are consistent with IHL internment standards. This review and accompanying analysis modestly seeks to present some initial reflections on these issues and by no means intends to be exhaustive.
II. INTERNMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL
In peacetime, as during armed conflict, persons may be detained awaiting trial for a crime or based upon conviction for a crime. For the individual non-state actor, participation in the conflict generally constitutes a crime under the domestic law of the state affected by the conflict. This secbombings of the U.S. embassies (August 7, 1998) in the East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya and the U.S.S. Cole (October 12, 2000) in Yemen. The Supreme Court in Hamdan did not question the U.S. assertion that an armed conflict with al-Qaeda began on September 11, 2001, however, the Court did not assert that it began prior to that date. Without explicitly stating the classification of the conflict, the Court found that Common Article 3 applied. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31. The Court rejected the Bush Administration's argument that the conflict with al-Qaeda was an international armed conflict based on the reasoning that an international armed conflict can only be between states. Id. But see First Additional Protocol, infra note 27, art. 1(4). The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that a non-international armed conflict can only occur within the territory of a single state. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631. Thus, the Court appears to have concluded that the conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict as understood for application of Common Article 3. 8 "According to the government, then, because the law of war has evolved primarily in the context of international armed conflicts between nations, the President has the authority to detain 'those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida or the Taliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable.'" Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. In an occupied territory, "[i]f the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety 
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GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW 201 measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment." 13 In contrast, conventional IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict provides no specific grounds for internment. Yet, conventional IHL contemplates that internment occurs in non-international armed conflict, as demonstrated by the references to internment found in Articles 5 and 6 of the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 14 In order to explain the absence of a legal basis for internment in IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict, a parallel will be drawn to the issue of the legality of non-state actors taking up arms against the state-that is, engaging in armed conflict. This is not a matter regulated by IHL, but by domestic law, which regulate-to a certain extent-internment. Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions makes no reference to internment. 15 and it is hard to imagine domestic legislation doing anything but prohibiting such action. 16 Thus, while a non-state actor by the mere fact of engaging in armed conflict violates domestic law, it does not violate IHL. IHL addresses the reality that non-international armed conflict exists-and that internment will occur during it-"by regulating it to ensure a minimum of humanity in this . . . illegal situation."
17
In addition to providing guidance on when internment may occur or begin, IHL applicable to international armed conflict also stipulates when the captivity must end-further clarifying the boundaries of permissible internment. Retention of medical and religious personnel must cease if prisoners of war are not in need. 18 According to the Third Geneva Convention, repatriation of prisoners of war takes place due to medical reasons during the conflict, 19 13 Id. art. 78 (emphasis added). and release and repatriation for all, without delay, must occur 14 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 5, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 (providing that "the following provisions shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained . . . .") [hereinafter Second Additional Protocol].
15
The use of force between states (international armed conflict) is a matter regulated by international law, i.e., jus ad bellum (distinct from jus in bello).
16
This explains the incorporation of Article 6(5) into the Second Additional Protocol. See Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6(5) (stating that at the end of hostilities authorities should grant broad amnesty to armed conflict participants and those deprived of liberty in relation to the armed conflict). Without amnesty, non-state actors may be reluctant to put down their arms because they likely violated domestic criminal law by their participation in hostilities.
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[ Vol. 42:197 after the cessation of active hostilities. 20 Unlike prisoners of war (with no medical reason requiring release), civilian internees may not necessarily be interned until the end of the conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides that a civilian must be released "as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist"; 21 this may be during the conflict. If, however, civilians remain interned for the duration of the conflict, "[i]nternment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities."
22
Captured combatants, simply because they are opposing combatants, are interned in order to prevent them from returning to the battlefield. Except when doubt arises as to whether the person is entitled to prisoner-ofwar status, 23 there is no need for an individual review, as the internment is not based on any particular individual characteristic but on mere formal membership in the state's armed forces (or formally accompanying the armed forces) and would run counter to the IHL objective for interning of prisoners of war. 24 Thus, generally only the basis for interning a civilian requires an assessment, As the reasoning behind the basis for internment of prisoners of war under IHL is unique, the reasoning does not extend to interned civilians in an international armed conflict or persons interned in a noninternational armed conflict. 25 as civilians-unlike combatants who are captured and become prisoners of war-may only be interned if and for as long as they pose an imperative security threat. The Fourth Geneva Convention applicable to international armed conflicts provides internment review procedures applicable to civilian internees, giving some detail regarding the type of body and timing of review. 26 The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions introduces an additional safeguard to the process. Reviews of medical reasons for the release of prisoners of war also take place. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109-17. 26 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43, 78(2).
27
The person interned is to "be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures were taken." Protocol Additional to the but provides no guidance regarding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate captivity. Again, Common Article 3 does not speak to the issue.
A civilian may be interned based on an individual determination that it is absolutely necessary for "imperative reasons of security"-rather than on mere formal membership in the state's armed forces as for prisoners of war. Thus, understanding the meaning and scope of "imperative reasons of security" is critical to appropriately applying IHL and ensuring no arbitrary deprivation of liberty takes place.
As the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated, "[t]he confinement of civilians during armed conflict may be permissible in limited cases, but has in any event to be in compliance with the provisions of . . . Geneva Convention IV." 30 In that regard, it is crucial to understand what is meant by the following language in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which stipulates the legal basis for internment: "if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary" 31 or, in occupied territory, "imperative reasons of security".
32
This legal basis requires that, for purposes of internment, persons must represent a real threat to the state's security in the present or in the future. The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention explains "[i]t did not seem possible to define the expression 'security of the State' in a more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to Governments to decide the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external security of the 
29
The Second Additional Protocol only states that "[i]f it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding." Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5(4). In the Second Additional Protocol's suggestion to grant amnesty for participation in hostilities, internment is mentioned: "[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained." Id. art. 6(5) (emphasis added).
30
3URVHFXWRU Y 'HODLü &DVH 1R ,7-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 578 (Nov. 16, 1998).
31
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 42 (emphasis added). [Vol. 42:197 State which justifies internment or assigned residence." 33 The ICTY agrees with the assertion that "the decision of whether a civilian constitutes a threat to the security of the State is largely left to its discretion"; 34 In the 'HODOLü case, the ICTY found the accused guilty of unlawful confinement of civilians-grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
however, this does not mean that no parameters exist on this discretion. 35 The ICTY "interpreted Article 42 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention] as permitting internment only if there are 'serious and legitimate reasons' to think that the interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the detaining power by means such as sabotage or espionage." 36 Clearly, internment is only permitted when absolutely necessary. Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a party to the conflict, or actions which are of direct assistance to an opposing party, may threaten the security of the former, which may, therefore, intern people or place them in assigned residence if it has serious and legitimate reasons to think that they may seriously prejudice its security by means such as sabotage or espionage.
The ICTY Trial Chamber held:
On the other hand, the mere fact that a person is a national of, or aligned with, an enemy party cannot be considered as threatening the security of the opposing party where he is living and is not, therefore, a valid reason for interning him or placing him in assigned residence. To justify recourse to such measures, the party must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real threat to its present or future security.
37
The Trial Chamber also stated:
The judicial or administrative body reviewing the decision of a party to a conflict to detain an individual must bear in mind that such measures of detention should only be taken if absolutely necessary for reasons of security. Thus, if these measures were inspired by other considerations, the re- viewing body would be bound to vacate them. Clearly, the procedures established in Geneva Convention IV itself are a minimum and the fundamental consideration must be that no civilian should be kept in assigned residence or in an internment camp for a longer time than the security of the detaining party absolutely demands.
38
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 39 and the ICTY agree that "it must be borne in mind that the measure of internment for reasons of security is an exceptional one and can never be taken on a collective basis", 40 i.e., that there must be an individual nexus. 41 The ICRC asserts "that internment . . . for the sole purpose of intelligence gathering, without the person involved otherwise presenting a real threat to State security, cannot be justified." 42 "interning or administratively detaining persons for the purpose of using them as 'bargaining chips' is also not justifiable as a reason for internment. Such deprivation of liberty would in fact amount to hostage-taking, which is prohibited."
44
"Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power" 45 meets the threshold of "imperative reasons of security". 46 Providing logistical support, analogous to that described in the Third Geneva Convention 47 Furthermore, given the discussion below on U.S. internment standards, it is important to emphasize that this standard of "imperative reasons of security" is distinct from that of "direct participation in hostilities."
for persons "accompanying" the armed forces rather than being part of them, can be considered direct assistance. Merely having political sympathy or political affiliation with the enemy cannot constitute "imperative reasons of security" for internment purposes. In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and often impossible. Treating a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for failure. Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained for two reasons:
x To prevent them from conducting further attacks.
x To gather information to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from conducting attacks. These reasons allow for two classes of persons to be detained and interrogated:
x Persons who have engaged in, or assisted those who engage in, terrorist or insurgent activities.
x Persons who have incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and terrorist activity, but who are not guilty of associating with such groups. People engaging in insurgent activities may be detained as enemies. Persons not guilty of associating with insurgent or terrorist groups may be detained and questioned for specific information. However, since these people have not-by virtue of their activities-represented a threat, they may be detained only long enough to obtain the relevant information. Since persons in the second category have not engaged in criminal or insurgent activities, they must be released, even if they refuse to provide information. Id. ¶ 7-40. 44 ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 380 n.20. 45 See COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 258 (regarding Article 42). 46 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 78.
47
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). First, these standards serve different purposes. The latter determines whether a civilian loses his or her presumptive 49 immunity from attack and may thus be directly targeted during that period 50 the authority to intern, particularly the distinction between civilians "directly participating in hostilities" and civilians not having done so but yet posing an imperative security threat). and the former determines whether a civilian during an international armed conflict may be interned. Second, their scopes of coverage differ. While the standard of "direct participation in hostilities" can-in rough terms-be considered an authorization to kill, the standard of "imperative reasons of security" merely initiates a temporary deprivation of a person's liberty; the latter standard is broader in scope. There is overlap only in that a civilian "directly participating in hostilities" would certainly meet the standard of "imperative reasons of security" for purposes of internment; the reverse is not automatically true. 49 "In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian." First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 50(1).
50
Despite mention of the standard of "direct participation in hostilities" in IHL treaty law, applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts, no definition of it exists in treaty law, state practice, or jurisprudence. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (also known as "Common Article 3"); Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 13; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 51(3). The Israeli Supreme Court is the only court to have addressed this notion in some detail. See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., HCJ 769/02 (Dec. 14, 2006). Lack of criteria to distinguish between peaceful civilians who cannot be directly attacked and civilians "directly participating in hostilities" who may be attacked for such time as that they directly participate in hostilities led the ICRC to engage a process, involving experts, to clarify the notion of "direct participation in hostilities" under IHL. The importance of this clarification has dramatically increased in parallel with the growing involvement of civilians in the conduct of hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The outcome of this process was released in the form of "interpretative guidance" in mid- 2009 In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the following cumulative criteria: 1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus). Id In response to the fact that IHL of non-international armed conflict (such as currently taking place in Afghanistan 52 ) only indicates that internment occurs in non-international conflicts but contains no indication of how it is to be regulated, 53 As mentioned, the provisions regulating internment in international armed conflict, unlike for non-international armed conflict, are set out according to protected person categories-for example, prisoners of war or civilians. However, this does not prevent application of those provisions to non-international armed conflict because "no fundamental difference between the regimes applicable to the two situations prohibits the application of those same" provisions, as long as the rules are applied according to the person's function rather than status. the U.S. Administration and courts have applied IHL of international armed conflict by analogy. How they have done so is discussed in more detail later. However, this section explains in general how IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to noninternational armed conflicts in order to address internment. The implications-both positive and negative-of doing so are also addressed. 54 This is particularly relevant as the status of combatants formally exists only in international armed conflicts. 55 Applied by analogy, IHL of international armed conflict would provide bases for internment. Thus, the standards of the Fourth Geneva Convention would apply to civilians and those of the Third Geneva Convention to persons designated as "combatants". 56 Whether fighters in a noninternational armed conflict can be analogized to "combatants" or remain civilians, who may be targeted when directly participating in hostilities, remains unsettled. 57 However, making the distinction between "combatants" and civilians in non-international armed conflict would appear consistent with current discussions by experts on the use of the "membership approach" to interpret "direct participation in hostilities" in such conflicts. See supra text accompany note 7. 53 See ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 377. 
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The "membership approach" considers an individual who fulfills a combat function-a function requiring direct participation in hostilities-to be a "member" of an armed group, such that that individual may be directly targeted until he or she disengages from that function or is placed hors de combat.
59
As analogous application does not confer combatant status, there would still, for example, be no combatant immunity. The Geneva Conventions, while allowing for internment, would therefore not prevent the repression of acts prohibited by domestic law. Nor would application by analogy of the Third Geneva Convention to members of armed forces and groups entitle them to any review procedure; such procedural regulation could only be found in the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is analogous to being a "combatant" in an international armed conflict. Applying this approach to internment, the "members" of an armed group could be held on the same (analogous) basis as combatants who are interned as prisoners of war in international armed conflict.
The question arises, however, as to whether the analogous application of the law of international armed conflicts sufficiently considers the fundamental distinction between that law and the law of non-international armed conflict-that is, that the rules applicable to international armed conflict generally 60 apply only to protected person categories, such as prisoners of war or enemy civilians, and that no such categories exist in noninternational armed conflict. Even if the distinction in non-international armed conflict could be made by function rather than status, on which criteria should the assessment of a civilian or "combatant" be based? Should "combatants" be measured against the criteria in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention or Article 44 of the First Additional Protocol, or perhaps through the "membership approach"? 61 Would Article 5-type tribunals 62 If the Third Geneva Convention is applied by analogy, a participant in hostilities could be detained without any individual periodic review for the whole duration of the conflict. need to be instituted in non-international armed conflicts to make the determination? 63 59 "Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians . . . , and lose protection against direct attack, for as long as they assume their continuous combat function." Id. at 70.
However, it is much more difficult in 60 An exception is, for example, Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 75. 61 See supra text accompanying note 59. 62 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5. [Vol. 42:197 non-international conflicts than in international armed conflicts to determine who is actually a fighter. 64 Such a determination must therefore be made on an individual basis. It is also much harder to determine the actual end of hostilities in a non-international armed conflict than in an international armed conflict between states, which may conclude a ceasefire or surrender. All this may support application, if at all, of the law of international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict by analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention alone, as there are no combatants and hence no concomitant prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be founded on a determination of the lex specialis according to the overall systemic purposes of the international legal order. 65 In a non-international armed conflict, analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention would avoid internment of persons without review or possible release 66 for the duration of the conflict. Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, brings with it an internment standard-"imperative reasons of security"-that is broader in scope than that for determining combatancy. But see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109-17 (referring to repatriation of prisoners of war during the conflict for medical reasons). 67 See id. art. 4; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 44. See also ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 25 (the "membership approach" using direct participation in hostilities). al terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 69 An AUMF must be distinguished from a declaration of war-of which there have only been eleven. 70 In particular, the domestic law ramifications of an AUMF differ substantially from declarations of war. 71 The language employed in AUMFs varies-each AUMF being drafted to the contours of a specific situation. Elsea's and Grimmet's report declares: With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with respect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing, alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered automatically by an authorization for the use of force. Most standby authorities do not require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war. While the Obama Administration has not asserted Executive power for its authority to intern but rather said it would rely on authority already provided by Congress through the AUMF, the Obama Administration continues to justify internment because of the existence of an armed conflict, stating that the AUMF is to be "informed by principle of the laws of war."
76
In fact, it appears that the Obama Administration follows the preceding Administration's view that the United States is involved in a "novel" type of armed conflict.
77
The Obama Administration's specific reference to the law of war in interpreting the AUMF is a positive step in that it ensures application of IHL, which was not always the case during the previous Administration.
78
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi determined that the use of force authorized by the AUMF includes the authority to intern individuals who are a part of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the context of an armed conflict:
However, if there is no armed conflict, the AUMF must not be informed by IHL, but by other applicable law: international human rights law and domestic law.
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be 75 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006) , available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf.
76
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1. 77 
Id.
78 "I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva." Memorandum from President George W. Bush to National Security Advisors, Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2(a) (Feb. 7, 2002) , available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. "I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an international character.'" Id. at 2(c).
an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to use. 79 The Supreme Court's analysis in Hamdi specifically focuses on armed conflict:
In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of "necessary and appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.
80
The Court did not address specifically whether the AUMF provides the basis to intern "non-combatants" or whether the AUMF provides the basis to intern in situations not rising to the level of armed conflict. These issues remain to be explicitly addressed. However, following the Court's reasoning, the identical conclusion could be reached for "peacetime" operations, i.e., law enforcement operations: If detention "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force'", 81 District Court Judge Ellen Huvelle's recent opinion indicated a limitation on the Executive's authority to intern. She wrote "the AUMF, which defines the Executive's detention authority in plain and unambiguous language, speaks only to the prevention of 'future acts of international terrorism against the United States.'" then certainly detention should also be similarly considered in law enforcement operations where permissible use of deadly force is much more circumscribed than is its use by and against combatants in an armed conflict.
82
[The AUMF] does not authorize unlimited, unreviewable detention. Instead, the AUMF requires some nexus between the force (i.e., detention) and its purpose (i.e., preventing individuals from rejoining the enemy to commit hostile acts). Accordingly, the AUMF does not authorize detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals While prevention of future acts could be interpreted quite broadly, Judge Huvelle points out that: 79 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (emphasis added) (plurality). 80 Id. at 519 (emphasis added). 81 Id. at 518. [Vol. 42:197 from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can no longer be attained.
83

B. The Initial U.S. Standard(s) for Internment: Creation of the "(Unlawful) Enemy Combatant" Category
This section looks at the internment standards employed by the United States and compares them to the IHL internment standards, thus providing the background necessary for discussion of the D.C. District Court's application of these standards that follows. First, the various definitions of "unlawful enemy combatant" employed under the Bush Administration are discussed. After which, the new standard provided by the Obama Administration will be compared and contrasted to IHL internment standards as well as the Bush Administration's definitions.
1.
U.S. definitions of "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy combatant"
Through the use of the definitions "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy combatant", the United States has created a category of persons not found in IHL, resulting in unfortunate consequences for the protective features of IHL. The Bush Administration
84
In Hamdi, the U.S. Government offered a definition of "enemy combatant" that more closely tracked the "direct participation in hostilities" standard than would subsequent definitions: "an individual who . . . was 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States and its coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the and Congress have over time utilized various definitions of "enemy combatant". 83 Basardh, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 8. 84 The Military Order in 2001 gave a first indication of whom the U.S. planned to intern:
[A]ny individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that: (1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order. United States' there." 85 As mentioned above, the standard of "direct participation in hostilities" in IHL is not an internment standard; rather, it determines when a civilian loses his or her protection against direct attack.
86
After Hamdi, the Order Establishing the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) broadened the definition of "enemy combatant". The Order provided that an "enemy combatant" is:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
87
According to this definition, anyone who merely supports the Taliban or al-Qaeda is deemed a "combatant". However, mere support of the war effort does not constitute combatancy. The concern with this standard 86 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 (regarding direct participation in hostilities) and 56-59 (regarding analogous application).
Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, at 1 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter July 7 Memo].
88
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance provides: The treaty terminology of taking a "direct" part in hostilities, which describes civilian conduct entailing loss of protection against direct attack, implies that there can also be "indirect" participation in hostilities, which does not lead to such loss of protection. Indeed, the distinction between a person's direct and indirect participation in hostilities corresponds, at the collective level of the opposing parties to an armed conflict, to that between the conduct of hostilities and other activities that are part of the general war effort or may be characterized as war-sustaining activities. Generally speaking, beyond the actual conduct of hostilities, the general war effort could be said to include all activities objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary (e.g. design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment, construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure outside the context of concrete military operations), while warsustaining activities would additionally include political, economic or media activities supporting the general war effort (e.g. political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or non-military industrial goods). Admittedly, both the general war effort and war-sustaining activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as direct participation in hostilities. Some of these activities may even be indispensable to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostilities, which is designed to cause-i.e. bring about the materialization of-the re-
[Vol. 42:197 is that it establishes "guilt" by association, that is simply being a group member-regardless of one's contribution-makes one an "enemy combatant". as well as added a definition of "unlawful enemy combatant". Some differences exist between these definitions. The MCA defines "unlawful enemy combatant" as follows: 90 Like the CSRT definition, this definition includes as "combatants" persons who have only supported, but not directly participated in hostilities. However, the MCA definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" may be somewhat narrower than the CSRT definition of "enemy combatant". For example, the U.S. Government had acknowledged that the CSRT definition of "enemy combatant" might include a "little old lady in Switzerland" sending money to support a charity which, unbeknownst to her, turned out to be a front for al-Qaeda.
91 Such a person would appear to fall outside the MCA definition, as the person must have "purposefully and materially supported hostilities." 92 2.
Why the "category" of "(unlawful) enemy combatant" is problematic from an IHL perspective Nevertheless, even the inclusion of "hostilities" in relation to "support" does not prevent this definition from being applied over broadly-possibly extending outside the scope of armed conflict.
As discussed above, the rules of IHL of non-international armed conflict are less elaborate than those applicable to international armed conflict. Thus, it may be appropriate to analogize to IHL of international armed quired harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 51-52 (citations omitted). 
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conflict. 93 Here, with respect to internment, analogy to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions or only to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be appropriate. It would be inappropriate, however, given the ramifications, to analogize merely to the Third Geneva Convention, if such analogy merges "fighters" and "civilians" into that single category. This, however, is what the U.S. "(unlawful) enemy combatant" category effectively does. 94 The U.S. category inappropriately merges the concept of "combatants" and civilians who pose an imperative threat to security because the definition of "enemy combatant" is broader than the corresponding definition of prisoner of war found in the Third Geneva Convention. 95 The U.S. category adds elements of the "imperative-reasons-of-security" standard for interning civilians during international armed conflict with some elements possibly even sweeping broader than that standard. 96 This designation of "enemy combatant" is particularly dangerous for the protection of persons in armed conflict as it confuses the authority to intern with the authority to kill. In creation of this designation, it appears that the United States has analogized solely to the Third Geneva Convention-and expanded its personal scope of application. Thus, if a person is determined to be an "enemy combatant" this would not only mean that the person may be interned as a prisoner of war for the duration of hostilities without periodic review, but may also be directly targeted as a combatant ( Its application also extends potentially beyond association with any armed conflict to police enforcement operations.
97
The Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war are to be tried by "the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power . . . ." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 102. See also id. art. 84.
98
It has been asserted that the definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" in the MCA is solely for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction for the military commissions.
[Vol. 42:197 This new definition of "enemy combatant" also affects the treatment to which individuals are entitled once captured. The incorporation of the notion of "unlawful enemy combatant" in, for example, the revised Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) confusingly overlaps with other "protected person categories."
99 According to the Field Manual, only "unlawful enemy combatants" may be subjected to the restricted interrogation technique of "separation". 100 Finally, application of such a category to members of terrorist organizations that generally attempt to hide their identities and blend into the civilian population will be extremely difficult. This raises the chances of misidentifying an individual as an "enemy combatant" with all its ramifications.
101
C. The Obama Administration's Internment Standard for Those Held at Guantánamo: Denouncing the "Enemy Combatant" Category?
While the new Administration has abandoned the term "enemy combatant", it remains to be seen whether it has actually abandoned the category. The specific purpose for the definition provided in the Government's memorandum filed on March 13, 2009 102 may indicate that criticism that the Administration's definition is "really a case of old wine in new bottles" 103 However, other sections of the MCA regarding detention refer to the statute's definition. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). See also Goodman, supra note 48, at 61 n.68. is premature.
99
The Army Field Manual states: Unlawful enemy combatants: Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term "unlawful enemy combatant" is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), ¶ 6-18 (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/ pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf. See also id. ¶ 6-19 (making a further distinction between an "unlawful enemy combatant" or an individual "associated with or supporting the unlawful enemy combatants"). This field manual on interrogation replaces the 1992 field manual, and this revised version was publicly released on September 6, 2006. 100 See id. app. M. 101 See supra text accompanying notes 60-65. See also Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 606-10. 102 "[T]he Government is refining its position with respect to its authority to detain those persons who are now being held at Guantanamo Bay." March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added). 103 
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The Government pointed out in its memorandum that it is "refining its position with respect to its authority to detain those persons who are now being held at Guantánamo Bay", 104 not "to define the contours of authority for military operations generally, or detention in other contexts." 105 As development of a comprehensive detention policy, which may introduce further changes, is underway at the time of this writing, Thus, this is an internment standard, not a targeting standard nor a determination of personal jurisdiction for use of military tribunals. If use of this definition remains limited solely as an internment standard, many of the concerns related to the "enemy combatant" category discussed above do not arise. If it does not, the refinements made to the definition are insufficient to alleviate those concerns.
106 the focus here must be on what can be evaluated at this time-whether this new definition in the March 13 memorandum comports with the requirements of IHL as relates to internment. Prior to doing so, however, it must be repeated that, if no armed conflict exists, the Government's basis for its authority to intern (i.e., the AUMF) should not be "necessarily informed by the principles of the laws of war."
107
The March 13 memorandum provides the following definitional framework for review of the habeas petitions:
Rather, the AUMF would need to be informed by relevant international human rights law and domestic law.
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/obama-administration-offers-essentiallysame-definition-enemy-combatant-with. 104 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added). 105 Id. at 2. 106 The March 13 memorandum makes clear that the U.S. Government analogizes to IHL, particularly "from traditional international armed conflicts."
109
The Government's preference for the Third Geneva Convention over the Fourth Geneva Convention becomes evident in its response to the petitioner's assertion that the U.S. authority to intern is limited to those "directly participating in hostilities". 110 The Government is correct that its authority to intern under IHL applicable to international armed conflict is broader (even as under the Third Geneva Convention with regard to those accompanying the armed forces 111 ) and the Government could simply have referred by analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention.
112 Instead, the March 13 memorandum refers to the "law-of-war principle of military necessity" 113 and the language of Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13 of the Second Additional Protocol, which reference "armed groups".
114
It must be recalled that Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13 of the Second Additional Protocol apply to non-international armed conflict in which a non-State actor is a party to the conflict, hence the reference to "armed groups". 115 The Government's reference to these provisions focusing on "armed groups" seems unnecessary and confusing and would seem to indicate that the United States believes it may only intern members of a fighting force, albeit it would consider such a fighting force to be defined more broadly than those persons covered by Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, i.e., those entitled to prisoner-of-war status.
116
In analyzing whether the above definitional framework is consistent with IHL standards for internment, its two sentences will be addressed separately. The first sentence of the March 13 memorandum states:
If that is the correct reading of the U.S. position, the March 13 memorandum's analysis raises a red flag that concerns could arise similar to those regarding the "enemy combatant" category, particularly if the definitional framework is applied beyond the purposes stated in the memorandum, e.g., for targeting purposes and not merely internment. 108 Id. at 2. 109 Id. 110 Id. at 8, 9. 111 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). 112 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 42, 78. 113 March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8-9. 114 See id. (discussing Common Article 3 and the Second Additional Protocol). 115 Id. 116 Id. at 8.
2009] GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW 221
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks.
117
This sentence, while appearing to track the language of the AUMF, omits an important clause-a clause limiting the Executive's authority to intern. That clause from the AUMF is the following: "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
118 IHL may only inform this internment standard if armed conflict occurred and continued after September 11, 2001 such that IHL applies. The U.S. Government considers that an armed conflict did continue, but others consider that, if an armed conflict took place on September 11, 2001, By its plain language, the AUMF does not permit the use of force against these specific persons unless it is to prevent future terrorist acts. Criminal law enforcement is the appropriate means for addressing criminal acts that have been committed.
119
Assuming that the armed conflict was ongoing from September 11, 2001 such that IHL continued to apply to those captured after that date, it must be recalled from the discussion above that the only bases for internment would be if a person is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to the Third Geneva Convention) or if reasons of security make it imperative to do so (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Past acts alone do not meet either standard. Thus, while a person who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, The second sentence of the March 13 memorandum states that: may certainly be held on criminal charges, he or she may only be captured and interned (under IHL) after September 11, 2001 if he or she continues to be a member of the fighting force or continues to pose an imperative security threat in the present or in the future. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.
121
As just mentioned, according to IHL a person may be interned if that person is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to the Third Geneva Convention) or if that person poses an imperative security threat in the present or in the future (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Preventive security detention is forward looking. Past acts alone may be the basis for criminal charges but alone are insufficient for internment. Hence the definitional framework's use of the past tense, for example, "were part of", "has committed", or "supported", could be cause for concern. However, the choice of past tense language may merely reflect the fact that the habeas review provided by the Supreme Court in Boumediene has, until recently, 122 been understood by the D.C. District Court to be a limited review of only the initial determination for internment; 123 Turning to the specific language of the second sentence of the definitional framework, the new definition requires a demonstration of "substantial" support of Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States and its collation partners, while the CSRT definition of "enemy combatant" required only "support" of those forces. Clearly, the new definition mandates passing a higher threshold than the CSRT definition to justify internment. However, it is not clear whether the new definition is better than the MCA definition of "unlawful enemy combatant", which focused on involvement in the hostilities ("purposefully and materially supported hostilities") rather than on how one supported a particular group. hence, the review is backward looking. The court is reviewing whether the initial decision to intern was valid, not whether the continued internment is justified (as required for civilian internees under the Fourth Geneva Convention).
Furthermore, the significance of the additional word "substantial" was left unclear by the Government, as it refrained from defining it in its memorandum:
It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and degree of "substantial support," or the precise characteristics of "associated forces," that are or would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework. Although the concept of "substantial support," for example, does not justify the detention at Guantanamo Bay of those who provide unwitting or insignificant support to the organizations identified in the AUMF, and the Government is not asserting that it can detain anyone at Guantanamo on such grounds, the particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will vary from case to case, and may require the identification and analysis of various analogues from traditional international armed conflicts. Accordingly, the contours of the "substantial support" and "associated forces" bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.
124
This new standard-as with the former-still includes individuals who were "part of . . . Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." Thus, it appears that membership alone is grounds for internment. Depending upon how being "part of" is understood, this standard could be very broad indeed. A person who is sympathetic to the objectives of al-Qaeda and carries a membership card could meet this definition. Such a standard is broader than that foreseen by either the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions. That "associated forces" is modified by reference to engagement in hostilitieslanguage usually reserved for armed conflicts-should help to restrain application only to situations rising to the level of armed conflict. 125 Also the March 13 Memorandum mentions that being "part of" may depend on a "formal or functional analysis of the individual's role." 126 This too indicates that membership may not be defined (or applied) too broadly, as it is similar to the "membership approach" taken in determining who permanently directly participates in hostilities. 127 The U.S. Government has indicated that this definitional framework may evolve as the executive branch develops its comprehensive detention policy. As of this writing, the D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five petitions under both the Bush and Obama Administrations. 130 In twentynine of those cases, the judges have decided that the Government has failed to establish "by a preponderance of the evidence" 131 that it had justification in holding those individuals and thus, ordered their release.
132
This section reviews some of these cases in order to assess whether the D.C. District Court's decisions are consistent with IHL internment standards. This analysis will look to see whether application of the Bush Administration's definition of "enemy combatant" or the new definition provided by the Obama Administration extend, in particular, beyond the Fourth Geneva Convention standard of "imperative reasons of security", as this standard is broader in scope than that found in the Third Geneva Convention. If this is the case, then individuals are not being held in compliance with IHL. In addition, this analysis will look at whether the court applies the Government's standards more restrictively than IHL permits. If that is so, the bases for this determination will be examined. It is one thing for the Government to apply a detention standard more narrowly than permitted under IHL, as no detaining authority is required to hold all individuals for which IHL authorizes internment. It is quite a different thing for the court to interpret the IHL internment standards more narrowly than traditionally understood. An overly narrow interpretation could significantly impact "warfighting" and the protective aims of IHL. 132 See Rosenberg, supra note 3. 133 Narrowing the scope of whom IHL permits to be interned shifts the balance of interests at stake. The purpose of internment is not to punish, but only to hinder the individuals' direct involvement in the armed conflict and/or to protect them. "The protection by [IHL] constitutes a compromise between the interest of the detaining power, the interest of the power on which the prisoner depends, and the prisoner's own interests." SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, at 155.
[Vol. 42:197 thus permitting internment until the end of hostilities. And, while "acknowledg[ing] the power of Judge Huvelle's argument," 138 Judge James Robertson declares that it "is not for me to decide. Combat operations in Afghanistan continue to this day and-in my view-the President's 'authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict' which is 'based on longstanding law-of-war principles' has yet to 'unravel.'" 139 Judge Richard Leon explains "the question before this Court is whether the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that each petitioner is being lawfully detained . . . ." 140 and thus may remain interned. This type of review is more akin to an Article 5 Tribunal 141 used to determine, when in doubt, whether someone in an international armed conflict is a prisoner of war and can be interned for the duration of hostilities. However, as discussed above, the definition of "enemy combatant" does not comport with the definition of "prisoner of war" found in the Third Geneva Convention. 142 Judge Huvelle's contrasting approach to review is discussed in more detail below. 143 
B. Application of the Bush Administration's "Enemy Combatant" Standard
Despite the concerns raised above that the "enemy combatant" standard sweeps more broadly than IHL standards, 144 Judge Leon-using the Bush Administration's definition 145 -has granted writs of habeas, which could indicate that this standard is being applied in practice in such a way that it does not reach beyond the permissible bases to intern under IHL.
The following section provides a more in depth review to see if this is true.
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needed. This is analogous to a member of a State's armed forces, who may serve as a cook but is also trained for combat. Finally, it should be recalled that the Third Geneva Convention permits the internment of civilians who accompany the armed forces providing services; however, such individuals are not combatants.
160
More recently, in Al Ginco v. Obama, 161 Judge Leon made clear that even if it is established that an individual had been "part of" the Taliban or al-Qaeda that does not make one an "enemy combatant" permanently. Judge Leon looked at a variety of factors and determined, in granting the petitioner's writ, that the pre-existing relationship had sufficiently been eroded over a sustained period of time 162 prior to Al Ginco's internment by the United States. 163 In so doing, Judge Leon implied that staying at a guesthouse or going to a training camp alone or in combination are not necessarily sufficient factors to make one an "enemy combatant": " [F] ive days at a guesthouse in Kabul combined with eighteen days at a training camp does not add up to a longstanding bond of brotherhood." 164 While Judge Leon, in granting Al Ginco's petition, recognized that a new standard had been presented by the Obama Administration, he did not reach the question of whether to adopt the Government's new definition in this case because "[t]he Government's theory of lawful detention here is not based on 'support' to either the Taliban or al Qaeda, but rather petitioner's being 'part of' the Taliban or al Qaeda when he was taken into custody." This is consistent with an IHL analysis. 165 160 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). As such persons working closely with the armed forces risked capture and should not be excluded from protection, they were included in the Third Geneva Convention because their "position when captured had given rise to difficulties during the Second World War. .amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/janko_unclassified_release_ order.pdf (memorandum order granting Al Ginco's petition for writ of habeas corpus). 162 Id. at 10-12. 163 Judge Leon explains:
[C]ombining the limited and brief nature of Janko's relationship with al Qaeda (and/or the Taliban), with the extreme conduct by his captors over a prolonged period of time, the conclusion is inescapable that his preexisting relationship, such as it was, was sufficiently vitiated that he was no longer "part of" al Qaeda (or the Taliban) at the time he was taken into custody . . . . Id. at 12. 164 Id. at 11. 165 168 Judge Huvelle based her review on the lawfulness of Basardh's continued detention-rather than the initial decision to detain-on the language of the AUMF, as the Executive now rests its authority on the AUMF as "informed by principle of the laws of war." 169 She wrote: "The statutory language of the AUMF, which defines the Executive's detention authority in plain and unambiguous terms, speaks only to the prevention of 'future acts of international terrorism against the United States.'" 170 Thus, Judge Huvelle concluded that "the AUMF does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can no longer be attained." 171 
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GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW 231 authority to "detain combatants for a limited purpose only" 172 -"to prevent the captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms again." 173 [T]his limitation on the Executive's detention authority is consistent with the administrative procedures that the government adopted in 2004 for the CSRT and Administrative Review Board proceedings for determining whether continued detention of a detainee is justified. In both sets of rules, the government is obligated to perform ongoing threat assessments of detainees based upon the detainee's current status.
In addition, Judge Huvelle pointed out that: 174 Judge Huvelle's approach to habeas review is analogous to the periodic review required for civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 175 The primary factor in Judge Huvelle's decision to grant Basardh's writ was that the petitioner's cooperation while at Guantánamo-for which he suffered physical attacks and credible death threats from other internees As of this writing only Judge Huvelle has adopted this approach. 176 -was publicly known, thus severing any ties with the enemy and foreclosing any risk that he could rejoin the enemy. Hence, Judge Huvelle concluded "that the government has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Basardh's continued detention is authorized under the AUMF's directive that such force be used 'in order to prevent future acts of international terrorism.'" This result is consistent with that which should be reached if the internment standard found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, pertaining to civilians, were employed. Internment of such an individual could no longer be deemed necessary "for imperative reasons of security". 178 172 Id.
